The Barbary Wars and Their Lesson for Combating Piracy Today

Over the past few years, Somali pirates have attacked numerous ships, hijacking more than forty in 2008, holding more than six hundred seafarers for ransom that same year,1 and extorting more than $150 million in ransom payments from December 2007 to November 2008.2 More troubling is that, as of September, reported pirate attacks for 2009 have already surpassed the total number reported in 2008—a strong indication that the problem of piracy is only worsening.3

Because of these attacks, shipping companies must choose between navigating dangerous waters and taking costly alternate routes in order to protect their crews and goods. In November 2008, Maersk, one of the world’s largest container shipping companies, announced that, until there are more convoys to protect its ships from attacks, some of its fleet will avoid taking the most direct sea route to the East through the Suez Canal, which leads to pirate-infested waters.4 By taking the next best route from Europe to the East—around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope—shipping companies such as Maersk will add an average of 5.7 days and three thousand miles to each trip. The average annual cost of this route change to such a shipping company will range in millions of dollars for each of its ships that uses the alternate route,5 not to mention short- and long-term expenses from additional wear on its vessels. And, of course, given the integrated nature of the economy and the amount of goods shipped to and from the East, such route changes negatively affect all industries, directly or indirectly.

Although the piracy threat has been well known to those in the shipping industry for a few years, it became manifest to most Americans in April 2009 when Somali pirates hijacked the Maersk Alabama and captured twenty U.S. sailors. Although the sailors soon regained control of the ship,6 four pirates took Captain Richard Phillips hostage on a lifeboat. The three-day standoff that ensued ended when a team of navy SEAL snipers rescued the captain.7 Fortunately, neither the captain nor any sailors were seriously harmed during this attack—but it is disconcerting that a small gang of third-world pirates dared to attack an American ship and abduct its captain. Why were the pirates not afraid of a standoff with the most powerful navy on earth?

To determine what is motivating these pirates and how the U.S. Navy should best combat their attacks, many policy analysts, historians, and defense experts are looking to the Barbary Wars—two wars the United States fought in the early 19th century to end North African piracy—for guidance. These experts are wise to look here, for the situation surrounding the Barbary pirates of the revolutionary era is similar in important respects to the situation surrounding the Somali pirates of today. Like the Somali pirates, the Barbary pirates attacked trade ships, stole goods, took prisoners, and demanded ransom from wealthy nations with strong militaries. And like the Somali pirates, the Barbary pirates got away with their thievery for some time. But unlike the Somali pirates, who continue their predations, after the Second Barbary War the Barbary pirates stopped assaulting U.S. ships—permanently.

Toward establishing a policy that can bring about this same effect with regard to the Somali pirates, it is instructive to examine those aspects of late-18th- and early-19th-century U.S. foreign policy that were effective against Barbary piracy and those that were not. In particular, it is instructive to identify why the First Barbary War failed to end the pirate attacks but the second succeeded. Let us consider the key events surrounding these two wars.

The Background to the Barbary Wars

After winning its independence from Britain, the United States faced many new challenges, one of which was defending its citizens from foreign aggressors. Many U.S. merchants ventured overseas to engage in trade, including to the Mediterranean, which offered lucrative exports such as Barbary horses, salted fish, leather hides, salt, wax, grain, olive oil, and dates.8 However, sailing these waters held great risk: Several pirate fleets, collectively known as the Barbary pirates, regularly robbed merchants, took prisoners, and demanded ransom.

Barbary piracy was a state-backed, state-directed activity that had been practiced for hundreds of years. The economies of the Barbary States—Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli—revolved around this piracy, and the governments of these states were partially financed by the plunder, ransom, and “gifts” extracted by pirates from merchants at gunpoint. The more dastardly governments regularly abducted sailors to hold for ransom, to sell into slavery, or to be enslaved as rowers in a galley.9

The Barbary States also routinely demanded tribute from other nations for “permission” to use the Mediterranean, as if the great sea were their property, which it certainly was not.10 Although the pirates’ demand for tribute amounted to nothing more than armed robbery, virtually all of the trading powers complied, including the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, and Venetians. Even the mighty naval powers Britain and France perfunctorily paid the tribute (a mere pittance for their hefty mercantilist economies) rather than go through the hassle involved in refusing to pay.11

Unfortunately, having recently become independent, the United States lacked the finances and navy to protect its citizens from these rapacious pirates. For this reason, the Barbary pirates considered U.S. ships easy prey and would attack many in the years to come.

Initial Attacks and Subsequent Appeasement

The first Barbary attack on a U.S. ship was in October 1784 when Moroccan pirates captured a merchant vessel, the Betsey. The emperor of Morocco ordered that the Betsey be brought to the Moroccan city of Tangier and announced that he would hold both the ship and crew prisoner until the United States signed a treaty with his state. News of this hijacking alarmed American merchants. If Barbary pirates were regularly or even occasionally to assault American ships, then insurance premiums and other security-related costs would skyrocket, thereby thwarting the profitability of Mediterranean trade.

Although there was much debate, the prevailing attitude among America’s leaders was that the best response to the pirates was negotiation. John Adams, for example, held that a military response was too costly and too risky for his young nation, and that the best solution to the problem was to sign a treaty.12 Further, he doubted that war would deter the pirates from assaulting U.S. ships, as the pirates would continue to receive tribute—and thus financing for their attacks—from nations such as Britain, France, and Holland.13 And so, shortly after the capture of the Betsey, a U.S. representative signed a formal treaty of peace with Morocco14 and agreed to pay a $20,000 ransom for the ship and its crew.15 With this treaty, the United States showed the Barbary pirates that abducting Americans for ransom was an easy path to riches.

The next significant attack on U.S. merchants was in July 1785. Algerine pirates captured two American vessels, the Maria and the Dauphin, along with their twenty-one crew. This incident was more calamitous than the Betsey incident for several reasons. First, Algiers was the most powerful and aggressive of the four Barbary States, whereas Morocco was arguably the weakest and most docile. Second, whereas Morocco held its captives merely to goad the United States into signing a treaty, Algiers intended to sell them as slaves. Third, Algiers’ initial demand for the release of U.S. citizens and property was nearly $60,000—three times the ransom America had paid Morocco.16 Given both limited funds and limited ability to borrow money, the young United States could not afford an expensive treaty with Algiers, nor could it afford to raise a navy quickly for a military response.

Over the next decade, America’s leaders were primarily preoccupied with the challenges of establishing a new constitutional government and were unable to free any of the prisoners taken by Barbary pirates. During this time, the Barbary pirates continued to attack American vessels; by November 1793, Algiers alone had captured 11 additional American ships and taken another 105 U.S. sailors prisoner.17 In March 1794, the United States turned again to the problem of piracy and Congress authorized the construction of six frigates to prevent future attacks in the Mediterranean. In an effort to forestall attacks while the construction of its new navy was underway, America negotiated treaties with Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis. Unfortunately, the United States lacked the military power and international respect to set the terms of these treaties, which turned out most unfavorably for America. For example, the 1795 treaty with Algiers cost America an estimated $1 million. This treaty, which was the single largest item in the American budget that year, required a ransom of $600,000 for all of the prisoners Algiers had taken, including thirty-four prisoners who had died in captivity,18 as well as $40,000 to be delivered annually as tribute—which, more often than not, the United States would pay in the form of gunships and munitions.19

When America was unable to provide the $600,000 to Algiers in a timely fashion, the Algerines pressured the United States into constructing a brand-new copper-bottomed 36-gun frigate for them—in addition to the three other warships the United States had already promised at the signing of the 1795 treaty.20 This 36-gun frigate was state of the art compared to the 20–24 gun frigates America built during the Quasi-War with France in 1798: Americans were literally building bet-ter gunships for the pirates who were robbing them than for themselves.21

The pirates’ demands became increasingly ridiculous. The bey (governor) of Tunis demanded one full barrel of gunpowder every time Tunis’s fortress guns saluted an arriving American ship, unless America immediately returned the salute with its own cannonade.22 This proved costly for America as gunpowder was expensive, and Tunis was generous with its salutes. Even more absurdly, the bashaw (governor) of Tripoli demanded $10,000 to help him mourn the death of George Washington.23 The dey (governor) of Algiers charged an inconvenience fee of $20,000 when the United States appointed a new consul, and demanded a gift of $17,000 on his and his eldest son’s birthdays as well as on each of the Muslim holidays.24 Worse, after the USS George Washington delivered a tribute payment to Algiers, the dey coerced the ship at gunpoint to deliver presents to the Ottoman emperor—while flying the Algerine flag. Doing so not only placed the George Washington diplomatically out of the U.S.’s commission and made it a target for enemies of Algiers, but it concretized the fact that U.S. sailors were essentially powerless to resist the dey’s edicts. According to the ship captain’s log, “tears fell at this instance of national humility.”25

These events demonstrated that the Barbary pirates would not cease their demands, no matter how much the United States gave in to them. The concessions not only failed to stop the pirates, but actually spurred them on and provided them with the resources—money, munitions, and ships—to prevail. The pirates’ attacks became more frequent; their demands, more severe. U.S. policy toward the Barbary States had to change substantially if the problem they posed was ever to be eliminated.

As if foretelling the change in public opinion to come, William Eaton, U.S. consul at Tunis, expressed his indignation at the George Washington incident in a letter to the secretary of state:

Behold thy [undrawn] sword hang on a slave—A voluntary slave, and serve a pirate! . . . Shall Tunis also lift his thievish arm, smite our scarred cheek, then bid us kiss the rod!? This is the price of peace! . . . Will nothing rouse my country!?26

The First Barbary War, 1801–1805

The bashaw of Tripoli felt shorted by the United States. Although he had extorted $60,000 from America in 1797, both Algiers and Tunis were now receiving annual tribute, whereas Tripoli was not. The bashaw was envious, so in October 1800 he issued an ultimatum demanding that the United States pay the same fee he had recently extorted from Sweden—$225,000 immediately plus $25,000 annually. Because his administration was voted out in November 1800, John Adams left this threat for the incoming Jefferson administration to contend with.

Thomas Jefferson had always favored a military response to the Barbary pirates, believing that terms obtained at the end of an effective military response are far more favorable than those obtained through peace negotiations.27 Jefferson also believed that paying tribute to the pirates was dishonorable and that it would be cheaper in the long run to build a navy to combat the pirates than to meet their demands indefinitely.28

In June 1801, rather than continue the U.S. policy of complying with the demands of the Barbary rulers, President Jefferson commissioned a four-ship squadron to the Mediterranean to prepare for war and to protect U.S. commerce.29 As it turned out, Tripoli—impatient with America’s slow response to the bashaw’s ultimatum—had already declared war in May 1801.30 Thus began the First Barbary War.

Americans, exasperated with Barbary piracy, rallied to war under the slogan “Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute!”31 And many Americans were willing to do whatever it took to end the Barbary threat. Among them was 25-year-old Lieutenant Stephen Decatur.

In October 1803, the Philadelphia, a 36-gun frigate, ran aground on the Tripolitan coast and was seized—along with its crew of 307 U.S. sailors—by Tripoli.32 The bashaw demanded $1,000 ransom for each sailor, more than double the fee he had demanded when he declared war almost three years earlier. And the United States had reason to believe that the bashaw would sell the ship to Algiers, which would finance Tripoli’s war effort while bolstering Algiers’ ability to terrorize the United States.33 Given Tripoli’s defenses, America concluded that it could not safely extricate the Philadelphia without sustaining heavy losses. Rather than allow Tripoli to use the powerful ship to its advantage, Americans hatched a plan to infiltrate the Tripolitan harbor and burn the Philadelphia. Decatur was selected to lead this dangerous mission.

Under cover of darkness, Decatur and his men sailed into the harbor disguised in a merchant ship, claiming that they had lost their anchors and needed to dock for the evening. The rest of the raid is best told by historian Frank Lambert:

Decatur brought [his ship] alongside the Philadelphia and took a rope aboard. As the crew then boarded the frigate, a shout went out from the watch, Americanos! After dodging a few pistol shots, the well-organized sailors overpowered the light opposition and began to load the combustibles onto the Philadelphia. The fort and pirate fleet remained silent as the Americans placed their charges and set fire to the frigate. When the crew re-entered [their ship] and pulled away from the burning ship, they came under fire. But as the flames rose aboard the Philadelphia, its stored powder exploded, and in the confusion [Decatur and his men] made it out with no one injured or killed. In what British admiral Lord Nelson called “the most bold and daring act of the age,” Decatur and his men executed the mission to perfection and reversed the tide of the Tripolitan War.34

Another incident exemplifying the resolve on the part of some Americans to defeat the pirates was a march through the desert in Libya to capture a key port city in Tripoli. The march was led by William Eaton, the consul who earlier decried U.S. unwillingness to fight piracy in the face of the George Washington incident. The port city in question—Derne—was well defended by sea but not by land. Its occupants assumed that no army would be willing to march through hundreds of miles of blistering desert to attack it. Yet this is exactly what Eaton’s army did; his band of nine Americans and more than four hundred mercenaries35 embarked on a 500-mile march through scorching heat to execute the seemingly impossible land assault on Derne.

The obstacles Eaton and his soldiers had to overcome during the fifty-day trek were formidable. After only twelve days, they were running out of water and had to resort to eating half rations of uncooked rice. Eaton also had to calm frequent threats of mutiny and desertion (many of which were obvious attempts by the mercenaries to extort higher wages mid-campaign). Despite the arduous journey, within four hours of its arrival Eaton’s army captured Derne, took its 12,000–15,000 inhabitants prisoner, and shortly thereafter weathered a subsequent counter-siege by the bashaw’s army.36

Unbeknownst to Eaton, who was planning to continue his successful cam-paign to the city of Tripoli, U.S. envoy Tobias Lear met with the bashaw to negotiate an end to the war. The bashaw demanded $200,000 for the release of all U.S. prisoners plus an annual tribute payment. Lear made a counteroffer: $60,000 in ransom but “not a cent” for tribute. The bashaw gladly accepted, and President Jefferson applauded Lear’s negotiations.37 Thus, although Americans rallied to war crying “not one cent for tribute,” Jefferson and Lear paid $60,000 in ransom to conclude the war.

As history would show, Jefferson and Lear’s distinguishing between tribute and ransom was self-deluding and disastrous. The pirates recognized no such distinction, and they exploited any opportunity to extort money from the United States. Whether the Americans called such coerced payment “tribute” or “ransom,” the pirates saw it as loot and were happy to take it under any name. So, although the war was officially over, the pirates would continue assaulting U.S. ships and imprisoning U.S. citizens.

Many were infuriated by the outcome of the First Barbary War. Eaton thought the war’s ending was premature and dishonorable. He wrote a long letter to the secretary of the navy explaining that, had Jefferson and the navy continued to support him and his army after they took Derne, they would have been able to capture the city of Tripoli and force the release of U.S. prisoners without any payment. In particular, Eaton was furious that the United States paid $60,000 in ransom for the release of U.S. prisoners when the 12,000–15,000 prisoners he took during his occupation of Derne could have been used as leverage. He argued further that the United States could have threatened to replace the bashaw with the bashaw’s exiled brother,38 which could have been a death sentence for the bashaw, who had usurped his brother’s throne and taken his brother’s family prisoner in 1795.39 In short, Eaton argued that it was foolish to have paid ransom when the United States clearly had the upper hand and could have ended the war honorably and resolutely.

A congressional committee agreed with Eaton’s sentiments, finding that his forces “would have marched to the throne of Tripoli, had he been supported by the cooperation of the American squadron.” They also found no basis in fact for Lear’s rationalizations for ending the war, which were “the danger to the American prisoners in Tripoli, the unfitness of the ships for service, and the want of means to prosecute the war.” Rather, the committee found Lear’s explanation to be “a veil to cover an inglorious deed”40 and concluded not only that the treaty Lear negotiated was unfavorable to Americans, but also that there was compelling evidence that the United States had the means to continue fighting the war and to force a more favorable outcome.

The Second Barbary War, 1815

Following the First Barbary War, the primary foe of the United States was the British Empire. As part of its mass conscription during its ongoing war with France, Great Britain began an effort to capture deserters from the British navy, many of whom had become naturalized U.S. citizens. In 1807, the British attacked and boarded an American ship, killing three U.S. sailors, injuring eighteen more, and abducting four suspected deserters. In response to public outrage over this incident, the United States withdrew its warships from the Mediterranean to focus on the growing British menace.41

Within one month after all U.S. warships had departed the Mediterranean, Algerine pirates hijacked three American merchant ships, on the grounds that the United States had failed to pay tribute over the previous two years. Preoccupied first by the British threat and then by the War of 1812, the United States ignored the Algerine assaults for several years. But after the War of 1812 ended, the battle-hardened U.S. Navy set out to retaliate against Algiers for its recent crimes. Thus began the Second Barbary War.

The Second Barbary War was much shorter than the first and ended very differently. After capturing two large Algerine gunships, America forced Algiers to surrender and sent representatives to meet with those of the dey. Unlike the U.S. representatives who oversaw the end of the First Barbary War, those who oversaw the end of the second refused to pay the pirates in any form, as a matter of principle. The main American representative was Captain Stephen Decatur, who was by then a naval hero from his efforts in the Barbary Wars and the War of 1812.

Decatur presented the dey’s representative with a treaty drafted prior to the meeting and told him that the draft treaty would “not be departed from in substance.”42 The treaty demanded that the dey release all prisoners without ransom, that Algiers pay America $10,000 in compensation for the capture of a U.S. ship, and that U.S. ships henceforth be free to sail unmolested in the Mediterranean.43

The dey’s representative complained profusely about the terms of the treaty, but Decatur refused to compromise on any essential points. For example, when the Algerine complained about having to pay restitution for American property, Decatur replied that, “as it was unjustly taken, it must be restored or paid for.”44 When the Algerine complained about the lack of tribute payments and requested that Algiers at least be provided with regular “gifts” of gunpowder, Decatur replied, “If you insist upon receiving gunpowder as tribute, you must expect to receive [cannon] balls with it.”45 And when the Algerine requested a few hours’ time to contemplate the terms of the agreement, Decatur replied that he would get “not a minute” and indicated that his men would capture all Algerine gunships spotted before the treaty was signed.46

Decatur recognized the necessity and effectiveness of dictating the terms of surrender. He once wrote to the secretary of the navy that any “attempt to conciliate [the Barbary rulers] except through the influence of their fears I should expect to be in vain.”47 And, after forcing the treaty on the Algerines, he noted that the Barbary pirates “now show every disposition to maintain a sincere peace with us, which is, doubtless, owing to the dread of our arms.”48 He then proceeded to force similar treaties on Tunis and Tripoli, treaties that demanded restitution payments, the release of prisoners, and an end to all assaults on U.S. ships henceforth.

The Barbary pirates never attacked U.S. ships again.

America’s success inspired other nations to take military action against the Barbary States. Edward Brenton, a 19th-century British naval captain and historian, wrote that British opinion and public policy could not accept “that England should tolerate what America had resented and punished.”49 Britain soon launched a naval fleet to liberate Europeans enslaved by Barbary pirates. When, in 1816, the dey of Algiers refused to free his European slaves without a fight, the British bombarded the harbor of Algiers. This campaign liberated more than sixteen hundred European slaves, many of whom had languished in an Algerine prison for more than thirty years.50

The United States had shown the world the best way to prevent pirate attacks: Deal with pirates via force and only via force, not granting them negotiations or concessions as a matter of principle. America had won the freedom for its citizens to navigate the Mediterranean without fear of pirate attacks, and other nations were following America’s example.

The Lesson

The events of the Barbary Wars demonstrate clearly the principle that the United States must readopt with respect to piracy. We must stand on principle for the rights of Americans and their ships to sail unassaulted on the high seas. This means that we must refuse to concede anything to pirates ever: If they attack American vessels, we must retaliate immediately with overwhelming force; if they insist upon receiving ransom payments and the like, they “must expect to receive [cannon] balls with it.”

As the Barbary Wars show, countries that negotiate with pirates provide them with incentive to continue their predations; countries that refuse to negotiate lessen that incentive; and countries that both refuse to negotiate and retaliate with force eradicate that incentive.

Had the United States refused on principle to enter into negotiations with Somali pirates and instead deployed the navy to hunt down and kill those who attack American vessels, these pirates would already have learned what Decatur taught the Barbary pirates: Attacking U.S. citizens invites destruction.

Unfortunately, the United States has yet to take anything like this approach with respect to Somali piracy. The current approach by the United States is to negotiate at all costs and to use force only as a last resort. This attitude is exemplified by the way the United States conducted itself in the Maersk Alabama hostage standoff in April 2009. For three days, a powerful U.S. destroyer carrying an elite SEAL sniper team patiently followed a malfunctioning lifeboat containing the pirates and their hostage, Captain Phillips, while negotiators tried to convince the pirates to release Phillips.51 The SEALs were ordered only to use force to rescue Phillips if they thought the pirates were about to shoot him. Only when Phillips’s death appeared to be imminent did the sniper team finally save him by executing the pirates—with three perfect simultaneous shots delivered at dusk to targets bobbing on a lifeboat.52 In other words, the United States needlessly subjected an American citizen to spending three days at gunpoint because negotiation took precedence over eliminating the threat to his life.

Unlike the Barbary pirates, the Somali pirates are not state sponsored; consequently, they are less organized, less sophisticated, and less competent than a modern-day equivalent of the Barbary pirates would be. And unlike the post-revolutionary United States, the United States today is arguably the most powerful nation on Earth. To properly defend its citizens from pirates, the United States must regain the resolve William Eaton and Stephen Decatur displayed in the early 19th century. And the United States must make clear that it will pay “not a cent” to pirates, and that pirates who demand payment will receive only bullets and bombs. If America heeded the lesson of the Barbary Wars—if she refused to negotiate with pirates as a matter of principle and responded to any and all pirate attacks with immediate and overwhelming force—then pirate attacks on U.S. citizens and vessels would, once again, be history.

About Doug Altner

Doug Altner is an assistant professor of mathematics at the United States Naval Academy. His field of professional expertise is operations research and he holds a PhD in industrial and systems engineering from the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is developing new courses in mathematical programming for USNA; has published several peer-reviewed articles, including multiple book chapters, in the field of discrete optimization; and has been invited to present his research at many scholarly conferences. The views expressed in his articles are his own and are not representative of those of USNA.

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